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Abstract 
 Corporate governance focus on a major issue to analyse whether the 
Chief Executive Officer of a firm should serve as board chairman is a 
debatable argument put forward in the changing world. In the wake of 
economic chaos globally with high-profile collapses of a number of large 
corporations in the recent years, has forced organisations to alter the 
composition of their corporate governance. The increase of pressure on 
corporate boards from enforcement agencies, as well as shareholders, 
challenges organisations to adopt new strategies and relook into their 
organisational structure. This article will look at literatures on various 
arguments put forward on the pros and cons of the CEO duality and its 
impact on firm effectiveness and performance. An analysis of theories of CG 
which includes Agency and Stewardship theories will be look into to have a 
clear picture on whether duality leads to firm effective performances or 
hinder performance. From the analysis, it can be concluded that there is no 
right or wrong board structure but generally shareholders and stakeholders 
are more inclined towards separation of the roles to promote independence 
and transparency. Although duality or separation may not have any direct 
linkage to firm performance, separation model promotes a healthier balance 
to the overall corporate governance of an organisation. A further research 
will be carried to look at the composition of the board in emerging 
corporations in gulf countries. 
 
Keywords: CEO duality, Agency theory, Stewardship theory, firm 
performance 
 
Introduction 
 Corporate governance normally refers to the guidelines by which 
corporations are managed. It specifies the distribution of rights and 
responsibilities among different participants in the corporation (such as the 
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board of directors, managers, shareholders, creditors, auditors, regulators, 
and other stakeholders) as well as the rules and procedures for making 
decisions in corporate affairs (Kiel & Nicholson 2003). Corporate 
governance mechanisms can be seen as falling into two main categories, 
either internal or external. Internal governance tools include the board of 
directors, subcommittees of the board, compensation programs designed to 
align the interests of managers and shareholders and other corporate control 
systems. External governance mechanism include accounting rules and 
regulatory reporting requirements, external auditors, the investment 
community, financial analysts, national laws and the shareholders themselves 
(Millet-Reyes & Zhao 2010). Duality role in a company means a person who 
has a dual role as Chairman of the board (COB) and Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) at the same time. Many companies in this era implement the policies 
that provide the opportunity for the COB to also take part in a company as 
CEO. Duality role in a company rises to some debate / disagreement about 
the negative effects of the duality role in a company. There are two theories 
that support and reject the duality role in a company which is agency theory 
and stewardship theory. Agency theory which denies the duality role can be 
defined as " the relationship between the principals, such as shareholders and 
agents such as the company executives and managers" Jensen & Meckling 
(1976), while the Stewardship theory that supports the duality role can be 
defined as a '' a steward Protects and maximises shareholder wealth through 
firm performance, Because by so doing, the steward's utility functions are 
maximized '' Donaldson (1990).  
 One of the key topics in corporate governance is the link between 
CEO duality and firm performance. CEO duality here refers to a firm’s Chief 
Executive Officer that also serves as Chairman of the board of directors 
(Boyd 1995). Various surveys carried out between 1999 and 2005 shows that 
in the United States of America (USA) between 60 and 80 per cent of all 
major corporations have the same person act as both the CEO and Chairman, 
whereas British, Canadian and Japanese companies has only about 10 to 20 
per cent of the combined role (Brownbill 2010). Some researches cannot 
substantiate conclusively a linkage between CEO duality and firm 
performance (Anderson, Melanson & Maly 2007) whereas others have 
recommended that the separation of the roles would provide a healthier 
balance to the relationship (Parker 1994). The purpose of this exploratory 
study is set out to investigate the relationship between firm performance and 
CEO duality. So the key question is whether CEO duality can be classified as 
a more superior method of successful corporate governance and in turn 
contributes to effective firm performance?  
 In this article, there are some sections such as literature review and 
critical analysis that will be used.  The literature review section will discuss 
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the descriptions of duality role, debate on agency theory and stewardship 
theory, application of agency theory and stewardship theory. Whereas in the 
critical analysis will look into the relationship between the duality role with 
organization performance (ROA) and financial performance (ROE). In 
addition, the advantages and disadvantages of duality role will also be 
discussed in this article to assist in deciding which one is better. 
 
Methodology 
 The methods that will be used to assist in the completion of this 
article is by using secondary data from previous research that has been done 
by other researchers and combined with my own critical analysis to give a 
conclusion whether a company should implement duality of role / duality 
role should be separated. 
 
Literature Review 
 CEO duality is a situation in which the Chairman of the Board at a 
company who also a Chief Executive Officer at the same time. This dual role 
is a policy from a company that implements a position to fill as COB and 
CEO. CEO duality requires a person to be able to perform the role as COB 
and CEO at the same time to lead the company. The roles of the COB are 
different with the roles of the CEO, but in the CEO duality; the person is 
required to carry out these roles simultaneously. Several roles as a COB are 
to ensure effective operation of the Board, to support and advice the CEO in 
the development and implementing the strategy, and some other roles. On 
the other hand, the roles of the CEO are to develop strategies for 
recommendation to the Board and ensure that agreed strategies are reflected 
in the business, ensure that the business performance is consistent with the 
Business Principles, and several other roles.  
 CEO duality in a company raised some debate among some 
researchers who rejected the duality role through the agency theory and who 
supports the existence of duality role through a stewardship theory. Besides, 
the advantages / disadvantages of CEO duality also provide arguments in 
determining whether CEO duality role good / bad for a company. Some 
differences in the opinion of the researchers regarding the duality role is 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) who argue that “having leadership that is 
focused with a single individual increases a firm's responsiveness and ability 
to secure critical resources”. On the other hand “CEO duality diminishes the 
monitoring role of the board of directors over the executive manager, and 
this in turn may have a negative effect on corporate performance” (Dayton, 
1984). This is certainly raises a very serious debate among the researchers in 
support their argument to determine which one is better for a company. 
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CEO Duality (Pros and cons) 
Advantages of CEO Duality 
 Clear direction of a single leader: A BOD who also serves as CEO 
certainly has enormous power within a company. The advantage to be gained 
by the presence of CEO duality is a clear direction of a single leader, this 
happens because of all the activities undertaken by the company only rely on 
one person. This is of course will provide a clear direction from the CEO to 
their managers, stakeholders, and their subordinates regarding the strategy 
and business decisions that exist within the company. 
 Efficiency and Effectiveness: In the CEO duality, efficient means 
the company does not need to spend more money to hire CEOs from outside 
so that it will certainly provide efficiencies for the company in minimizing 
their expenses. On the other hand, effective in the presence of CEO duality 
means substantial power as the BOD and CEO provide the effectiveness of 
the company in making a decision to reach the goals of the company; this is 
because in CEO duality does not require a long process in making a decision, 
so it will save more time. 
Disadvantages of CEO Duality: 
 Segregation of Duty: A strong power in the CEO duality actually is 
good because it can create a clear direction of a single leader, but on the 
other hand it is also a disadvantage of CEO duality. This is because if a 
person has enormous power within a company then it will create segregation 
of duty.  
 Lack of transparency: This happen because of the strong power 
possessed by the CEO duality provides an opportunity to hide whatever is in 
the company which resulting in lack of transparency of the company.  
 Theories of Corporate Governance: 
 
Agency theory 
 It was first used as a theory in economics by Alchian and Demsetz 
(1972). In the past decades, the agency theory which can be explained as the 
relationship between the principal (Stakeholders) to its agent (Management) 
is more often used as theories in many fields. Eisenhardt (1989) states that 
“the agency theory is used in many fields such as accounting, marketing, 
organizational behaviour, political science, and sociology”. Basically, 
agency theory is a theory which suggests the separating roles of the BOD 
and CEO in running a company to achieve the goals. Agency theory 
emphasizes that a company should not be led by one person who plays a dual 
role as the BOD and CEO in a company. This means that the principal elects 
the board, who in turn elect the management team to execute the routine 
daily business decisions (Abdullah and Valentine, 2009). The purpose of the 
agency theory which suggests that the separation of roles between the BOD 
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and the CEO is to reduce agency cost. Other than that the theory also 
assumes that when a conflicting management decision, the principal or the 
agent has selects the best option that increases their own self - interest (Davis 
et al., 1997). Agency theory is the most dominant theoretical framework in 
corporate governance research. It is a simple theory that corporations 
consists of two participants – managers (agents) and shareholders (principal) 
and the fact that human beings act as self-interested and generally unwilling 
to sacrifice personal interests for the interest of others (Brownbill 2010). 
Agency theory suggests that CEO duality increases an organisation’s agency 
cost as management might pursue their own self-interest by forgoing an 
opportunity that may be in the best interest of the shareholders. Hence it is 
believed that in order to minimise agency costs, the role of CEO and 
chairman should be split (Abels & Martelli 2011).  Generally duality 
deteriorates the fiduciary oversight power of the board of directors – in other 
words, there wouldn’t be a solid checks and balances mechanism (McGrath 
2009). CEOs are held liable to shareholders through the Chairman and the 
board of directors. When a CEO dominates the board through a dual role, it 
can hamper and weaken the protection sought by shareholders (Nicholson & 
Kiel 2007). An implication of agency theory is that where CEO duality is 
retained, shareholders interest could be protected by aligning the interests of 
the CEO and shareholders by a suitable incentive scheme for the CEO 
(Donaldson & Davis 1991). CEO duality can also complicate the issue of 
CEO succession whereby the CEO retires but remain his/her role as the 
chairman. Although the role is separated but the chairman role is no longer 
deemed as independent and the board might take sides with the chairman 
whom they have a history with that would lead to conflict of interest 
(McGrath 2009). 
 
Stewardship theory  
 This is an alternative framework to the agency theory, with its roots 
in psychology and sociology, and it explains corporate structures in which 
the stewards (management) are inclined and motivated to operate in the best 
interest of their shareholders (Davis et al., 1997). Stewardship theory is a 
theory which supports the CEO duality in a company and this theory is the 
rejection of the agency theory which explaining the negative effects of the 
duality role and suggests duality role should be separated. Stewardship 
theory emphasizes that a firm should apply the duality role where BOD is 
also the CEO of a company. The main purpose of the existence of 
stewardship theory is to reduce the monitoring and controlling costs; this is 
because if a BOD also becomes the CEO, the company certainly does not 
need to pay more to hire a CEO from outside the BOD. Other than that, 
(McGrath , 2009) stated that “the merging of duality roles institutes a 
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harmony between the board of directors, managers and shareholders, the 
which is more efficient and effective in order to reach the goals of increasing 
sales and profit maximization within organizations”. Stewardship theory 
deems that management (stewards) are inclined and motivated to operate in 
the best interest of their shareholders. Unlike agency theory, it believes that 
management are trustworthy stewards who ultimately desire to execute 
decisions that benefit the entire organisation rather than personal 
gratification (Abels & Martelli 2011). The supporters of this theory believe 
that when one person holds both roles, he or she is able to act more 
efficiently and effectively. Duality creates unity across the company’s 
managers and board of directors, which ultimately allows the CEO to serve 
the shareholders better (McGrath 2009). Studies have shown that the returns 
to shareholders are improved by combining rather than separating the roles 
of the chairman and CEO which appeases the stewardship theory. It is said 
that when owner (principle) reduces its power but instead empower their 
managers then the returns of shareholders are safeguarded (Donaldson & 
Davis 1991).  
 It is believed that separation of the roles dilute the power of the CEO 
to provide effective leadership, creates potentiality of rivalry between the 
chairman and CEO, leading to compromise rather than decisiveness and 
having two spokesperson can lead to confusion and opportunity for third 
parties to take advantage of the situation. Joint roles may enhance external 
relationship as it is interpreted as an organisation with strong leadership and 
a clear sense of direction (Daily & Dalton 1997). 
 
Debate of Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory 
 Debate between agency theory and stewardship theory by several 
researchers produce a lot of different views on each of these theories. 
Agency theory that supports the separation roles of the COB and CEO stated 
that CEO duality gives a negative effect for the company. Agency theory 
emphasizes the negative impact of CEO duality in terms of company 
performance (ROA) and financial performance (ROE) in a company that 
adopted a system of CEO duality.  
 This statement is supported by several researchers such as  Jensen 
and Meckling , 1976; Fama and Jensen , 1983; Eisenhardt , 1989; Rechner 
and Dalton , 1991; who states that “a centralized authority leadership may 
lead to management 's domination of the board , the which results in poor 
performance”. By seeing the negative effects caused by the CEO duality 
certainly make many people feel that CEO duality is a bad thing for a 
company. 
 Several researchers through their respective arguments debate about 
stewardship theory as a counter in response to agency theory which stated 
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that CEO duality should be separated. Stewardship theory which supports the 
duality role in a company's emphasizes that CEO duality gives positive effect 
within a company. Stewardship theory emphasizes the flexibility that is 
owned by the COB who also the CEO can assist in improving company 
performance (ROA) and financial performance (ROE). This statement is 
supported by several researchers who support the existence of CEO duality 
such as Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Davis et al., 1997, who states that 
“corporate performance can be enhanced, when the executive manager has 
full authority over his corporation by serving also as the chairman, as less 
conflict is Likely to happen”. This is of course led to a long debate between 
the two theories that would cause confusion for many people. 
 So which theory is more favourable? A lot of studies are inconclusive 
and has a mix outcome on which framework is more superior to the other. 
Generally studies have shown that independent directors are associated with 
higher firm performance (Abels & Martelli 2011). Separation of the roles 
does indicate higher independence where a chairman is non-executive or not 
previously a CEO of the organisation but who has sufficient knowledge of 
the industry and commitment to the job alongside a dynamic boardroom 
culture would allow the chairman and the board to provide a fresh 
perspective when examining issues raised by management (Coombes & 
Wong 2004). The most visible support of separation of the roles is activist 
shareholders which are normally institutional investors. They are an 
increasing powerful force in the corporate world controlling more than one 
trillion dollars of corporate equity (Daily & Dalton 1997). The continuous 
assertion to the debate is that a chairman should be an independent 
monitoring/counsellor of a firm’s management especially to the CEO 
whereby separation of the roles do provide this independence (Daily & 
Dalton 1997). 
 Generally corporate governance in the United Kingdom and the 
United States shares a lot of similarities but when it comes to CEO dualism, 
there is a big difference in view. The view in the United Kingdom and other 
countries (refer to fig.1 below) that embrace the idea of separation is that the 
tasks of the chairman and CEO are different and potentially conflicting 
(Coombes & Wong 2004). One of the major roles of the chairman is to 
monitor and manage the CEO. It is also believed that when the roles are 
combined, it gives an opportunity for information to be withhold and 
therefore reducing transparency and access to information. Essentially the 
separation of the role is to provide a healthier balance and a check and 
balance mechanism to the system (Parker 1994). Some says that separation is 
viewed as an emergency measure for financially troubled companies (Daily 
& Dalton 1997). Generally the role of the board is to provide guidance to 
management who then look into the day to day function of the organisation. 
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The board’s role is to actively question the CEO and seek for open 
information and open dialogue in order to have an effective decision making 
process (Kiel & Nicholson 2003). There is plenty of evidence to show that a 
weak and inefficient board will sooner or later allow even a good company 
to falter, lose its way, and perhaps even fail. A strong and independent board 
of directors is therefore the bedrock on which effective corporate governance 
must be founded (Parker 1994).  
 It is well known that there are two main types of board structure: one-
tier boards (unitary) and two-tier boards (Tse 2009). Within Europe, the 
United Kingdom is a prominent country with a one-tier board system 
whereby Germany employs the dualism of a management board and a 
separate supervisory board (Jungmann 2006). In Australia and the United 
States, unitary boards structure are practised as well (Kiel & Nicholson 
2003).  Unitary board refers to a single layered board structure that consists 
of non-executives and executives directors. The other board structure, 
dualism board consists of a supervisory board and executive board of 
management where there is a clear separation of functions between 
supervision and management (Tse 2009). In the United Kingdom, although it 
follows a unitary board structure, about 95 per cent of all FTSE 350 
companies adhere to the principle of separating the CEO-chairman role. In 
the United States, by contrast, about 80 per cent of S&P 500 companies 
practices CEO duality.   
 The chart below depicts the percentage of listed companies in ten 
countries globally with split chairman-CEO roles (Coombes & Wong 204): 
 
 
 From the chart above it can be seen that separation of the role is 
gaining popularity in the 21st century. Majority of the countries listed in the 
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Fig. 1 
To split or not to split? 
% of listed companies with split chairman-CEO roles 
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chart have more than 50 per cent of its listed companies with split chairman-
CEO roles.  
 So what is the relationship between CEO duality and firm 
performance? Studies seem to indicate that duality doesn’t have a direct 
correlation to how well a company performs. It is surprising to learn that 
high-profile corporate scandals like Enron and WorldCom which is 
essentially due to CEO corruption, did not have a duality structure (Coombes 
& Wong 2004).  
 In an empirical study conducted in 2014 on European Union (EU) 
listed firms by Huining Chen (2014) revealed that CEO duality does not have 
much influence on firm performance. There still exist a debate ongoing with 
the primary theories of CG, agency and stewardship. 
 
Recommendations and Conclusions 
 From the studies and researches, it seems that there is no right or 
wrong board structure or theory towards successful corporate governance 
and in turn firm performance. No other board structure is more superior to 
the other. It is highly dependable on the goals and strategy of the 
organisation, legal requirements of the country as well as underlying human 
factors. Supporters of separation generally believe that independence of the 
board is the key to successful corporate governance whereas dualism 
believes that it showcases unity and strong leadership. In every businesses 
there is a need for a check and balance mechanism which CEO duality seems 
to be lacking. Generally who is monitoring the CEO except the CEO in a 
duality model? CEO duality also does not promote independence in the 
corporate structure which is an essential element to healthy corporate 
governance. Separation on the other hand promotes independence but it is 
also largely dependable on the characteristics of the individual person 
handling the separate roles. It can also lead to conflicts when both parties are 
dominant.   
 The recommendation is that with the increasing demand and 
expectations from shareholders and stakeholders and the sheer magnitude of 
the combine tasks involved,  it is not encouraging for one individual (CEO 
and chairman) to carry two such increasingly difficult jobs. Separation of the 
role provides a healthier balance especially in a large and complex 
multinational group. It would allow space for CEO to focus on the day-to-
day management of the business whilst the chairman to look into the board’s 
expanding responsibilities. Having said that, the essential part of the 
separation module is the CEO-chairman relationship in ensuring that there is 
transparency and a continuous flow of information between both parties for 
effective decision making in the interest of the shareholders and 
stakeholders.  
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 CEO duality can be effective during certain period of time such as 
financial crisis or when the organisation is at its early stage as it would 
promote fast decision making and portray a united front to stakeholders. 
However, as the organisation grows and the structure becomes more 
complex, it does not promote independence, transparency and balance of 
power. There is no right or wrong board structure but generally shareholders 
and stake holders are more inclined towards separation of the roles to 
promote independence and transparency. Although duality or separation may 
not have any direct linkage to firm performance, separation model promotes 
a healthier balance to the overall corporate governance of an organisation.  
 
References: 
Abdullah, H. & Valentine, B. ‘‘Fundamental and ethics theories of corporate 
governance’’. Middle Eastern Finance and Economics, 4(4), pp. 88-96, 2009. 
Abels, P. B., & Martelli, J. T. CEO Duality: How many hats are too many? 
Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 13(2), pp. 135-147, 2013. 
Alchian, A. & Demsetz, H. Production, Information Costs and Economic 
Organization. American Economic Review, 62, 777–795, 1972. 
Anderson, DW, Melanson, SJ & Maly, J. 'The evolution of corporate 
governance: power redistribution brings boards to life', Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, vol. 15, no. 5, pp. 780-797, 2007. 
Boyd, B. K. CEO Duality and Firm Performance: A Contingency Model. 
Strategic Management Journal, 16, pp. 301-312, 1995. 
Brownbill, N. Should the CEO also be the Chairman? The duality debate, 
2010.  
Carty, R., & Weiss, G. Does CEO duality affect corporate performance? 
Evidence from the US banking crisis. Journal of Financial Regulation and 
Compliance, 20(1), pp. 26-40, 2012. 
Chahine, S., & Tohmé, N. S. Is CEO Duality Always Negative? An 
Exploration of CEO Duality and Ownership Structure in the Arab IPO 
Context. Journal compilation, 17(2), pp. 123–141, 2009. 
Coombes, P & Wong, SC-Y. Chairman and ceo --one job or two?', 
McKinsey Quarterly,no. 2, pp. 42-47, 2004. 
Davis, J., Schoorman, F. and Donaldson, L. Toward a stewardship theory of 
management. Academy of Management Review, 22(1), pp. 20-47, 1997. 
Donaldson, L. 'The ethereal hand: Organizational economics and 
management theory'. Academy of Management Review, IS, pp. 369-381, 
1990. 
Donaldson, L., & Davis, J. H. Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO 
Governance and Shareholder Returns. Australian Journal of Management, 
16(1), pp. 49-64, 1991. 
European Scientific Journal December 2015 /SPECIAL/ edition Vol.1   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
43 
Elsayed, K. Does CEO Duality Really Affect Corporate Performance? 
Journal compilation, 15(6), pp. 1203-1214, 2007. 
Eisenhardt, K. M. Making fast strategic decisions in high-velocity 
environments. Academy of Management Journal, 32, pp. 543-576, 1989. 
Fama, E. F. and M. N. Jensen. Separation of ownership and control. Journal 
of Law and Economics, 26(2), pp. 301-325, 1983. 
Horner, S. V. Board Power, CEO Appointments and CEO Duality. Academy 
of Strategic Management Journal, 9(2), pp. 43-58, 2010. 
Huining Chen. 3rd IBA Bachelor Thesis Conference, July 3rd, 2014, 
Enschede, The Netherlands , 2014. 
Jensen, M. and Meckling, W. “Theory of the firm: managerial behaviour, 
agency costs and ownership structure”. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 
pp. 350-360, 1976. 
Jungmann, C. 'The Effectiveness of Corporate Governance in One-Tier and 
Two-Tier Board Systems – Evidence from the UK and Germany –', 
European Company & Financial Law Review, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 426-474, 
2006. 
Kaymak, T. & Bektas, E. East meets west? Board characteristics in an 
emerging market: Evidence from Turkish banks. Corporate Governance, 16 
(6), pp. 550-561, 2008. 
Kiel, G & Nicholson, G. Boards that work, McGraw-Hill, Australia, 2003. 
Majid Abbasi, Elham Kalantari, Hamideh Abbasi. The Impact of Corporate 
Governance on Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Duality in Iranian Banking 
Sector, Kuwait Chapter of Arabian Journal of Business and Management 
Review, Vol. 2, No.1; Sep 2012. 
McGrath, J. (2009), ‘‘How CEOs work’’, How Stuff Works, available at: 
http://money.howstuffworks.com/ceo.htm. 
Michael Braun, & Sharma, A. Should the CEO Also Be Chair of the Board? 
An Empirical Examination of Family-Controlled Public Firms. FAMILY 
BUSINESS REVIEW, xx(2), pp. 111-126, 2007. 
Millet-Reyes, B & Zhao, R. 'A comparison between one-tier and two-tier 
board structures in france', Journal of International Financial Management & 
Accounting, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 279-310, 2010. 
Modum, U., & Ugwoke, R. O. Content Analysis of The Effect of CEO 
Duality On The Corporate Performance of Quoted Companies On The 
Nigerian Stock Exchance 2006-2012. European Journal of Business and 
Social Sciences, 2(6), pp. 61-77, 2013. 
MOSCU, R.-G. Does CEO Duality Really Affect Corporate Performance? 
International Journal of Academic Research in Economics and Management 
Sciences, 2(1), pp. 156-166, 2013. 
European Scientific Journal December 2015 /SPECIAL/ edition Vol.1   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
44 
Nicholson, GJ & Kiel, GC. 'Can directors impact performance? A case-based 
test of three theories of corporate governance', Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 585-608, 2007. 
Parker, H. 'The chairman/ceo separation: view one', Directors and boards, pp. 
42 – 45,1994. 
Pfeffer, J. and G. Salancik. The External Control of Organizations: A 
Resource Dependence Perspective. Harper and Row, New York, 1978. 
Pi, L. & Timme, S. Corporate Control and Bank Efficiency. Journal of 
Banking and Finance, 17, 515–530, 1993.  
Rechner, P. L. & Dalton, D. R. CEO duality and organizational performance: 
A longitudinal study. Strategic Management Journal, 12(2), pp. 155-160, 
1991. 
Simpson, W.G. & Gleason, A.E. Board structure, ownership, and financial 
distress in banking firms. International Review of Economics and Finance, 8 
(3), pp. 281-292, 1999. 
Tse, G. Unitary or dual board structure: which one serves shareholders' 
interests best?, 2009. 
 
 
 
  
 
  
